conditions of Vienna of the period. This theorem does not make the Weak Axiom assumption and presumably fixed point methods were used in the proof. However, the paper apparently has not survived and did not directly influence the writers of the fifties.
The classical theorem is characterized above all by its use of assumptions of finiteness and convexity. That is, the economy comprises a finite number of economic agents or consumers who trade in a single market under conditions of certainty. The goods are finite in number and, as a consequence, the horizon is finite. Goods are divisible, and production is modeled either as a set of linear activities in the space of goods or as convex input-output sets belonging to a finite list of firms. Consumption sets and preference relations are also convex in an appropriate sense. Consumption and production activities are mutually independent.
In subsequent years the abstract model of an economy has been complicated for the existence theorems in many directions, principally weakening the crucial finiteness and convexity assumptions. However, somewhat surprisingly, in recent years the classical theorem itself has been improved in basic ways by Andreu Mas-Colell and James Moore. Mas-Colell [16] and Gale and Mas-Colell [9] showed that preferences need not be assumed transitive or complete. On the other hand, Moore [21] showed that the assumption that agents may survive without trade is superfluous for an irreducible economy.
In this paper I will introduce these innovations into an exposition based on the use of demand functions and production sets. I believe this order of proof is best for economic understanding and also for achieving the weakest assumptions. In particular, the Mas-Colell-Gale assumptions are weakened and a way is found to incorporate a version of the Moore result without returning to classical preferences. I shall also discuss three other themes that have been pursued in recent papers, the inclusion of external economies affecting production and consumption sets, the representation of firms as coalitions of economic agents, and the elimination of the free disposal assumption by new means.
THE CLASSICAL THEOREM
I will use the theorem of my paper of 1959 to represent the classical theorem on existence in fully developed form. The assumptions of this theorem fall naturally into three groups, assumptions on the consumption sets Xi, on the total production set Y, and on the relations between these sets. First, for the consumption sets, which lie in R", the Cartesian product of n real lines, we assume (1) Xi is convex, closed, and bounded from below.
(2) Xi is completely ordered by a convex and closed preference relatioTn.
Xi is interpreted as the set of feasible trades of the ith consumer. There are m consumers. That Xi is bounded from below means that there is {i such that x > 4, holds for all x E Xi. Convexity of the preference relation > i means that x >-ix' implies x" >-ix' where x" = tx + (1 -t)x', for 0 < t < 1. Closure of XJi means that xs-x and xS ox',where x'>x implies xKx'. For the total production set Y, which also lies in R ', we assume (3) Y is a closed convex cone.
Y n R+ = {0}.
R + is the nonnegative cone of Rn. The assumption that Y is a cone recognizes the role of constant returns to scale as a basis for perfect competition. It may be defended as an approximation when efficient firm sizes are small, and in this sense was accepted by both Marshall and Walras. It may be argued that the error of this approximation is of the same order as the error introduced by the assumption of convexity in the presence of indivisible goods. In any case the assumption of convex production sets for firms may be shown to be mathematically equivalent to Assumption ( The first part of this assumption states that any consumer can survive without trade. The second part implies that we may choose the price space so that any price p that supports Y will have p * x < 0 for some x E X. In other words, if p is compatible with equilibrium in the production sector, there is a feasible trade for the group of all consumers with negative value. This may be interpreted as saying that some consumer has income, in the sense that he is not on the boundary of his consumption set. , implies Assumption (6), but the converse is not true. Since they assume that a household can survive with less of all the resources it holds (p. 77), they are able to take w equal to a small fraction of the resources held by I2 consumers. Then it is supposed that I, consumers can be benefited with this w.
The purpose of Assumption (6) is to insure that everyone has income, if someone has income, at any price vector that supports the production set Y at y as well as the sets of consumption vectors at least as good as xi, at the points xi. Then if we choose I, to contain just the indices of the consumers with income, nonempty by Assumption (5), p * x,l > 0 must hold. Also Assumption (6) with Assumption (2) implies local nonsatiation within the feasible set X n Y so that p * x,,= 0. Sincep y = 0 andp -y' < 0, it follows thatp -w < 0. But w E X,2 so some consumer in I2 has income in contradiction to the choice of II. Thus I2 must be empty, and the result follows.
Competitive equilibrium is defined by a price vector p E Rn, an output vector y, and vectors xl, . .. , x,m of consumer trades that satisfy The first condition corresponds to Walras' requirement that in equilibrium there should be "ni benefice, ni perte" [34, p. 225]. It is not possible for a combination of resources to be formed that allows larger payments to some resource than those implied by p. Resources belonging to "entrepreneurs" are priced along with hired factors, and the entire income of a productive activity is imputed to the cooperating factors. This is the traditional picture of perfect competition in Marshall [15] , as well as in Walras.
The second condition implies that consumers maximize preference over their budget sets. Debts and taxes are ignored in the classical theorems, though many writers have introduced them subsequently. The third condition says that consumer trades sum to the total production. Given p y = 0 andp * xi < 0 it follows from condition (III) thatp * xi = 0.
We make the following definition. Debreu [7] has defined a weaker notion of equilibrium which he calls "quasiequilibrium." A quasi-equilibrium in our setting satisfies (I) and (III), but in place of (II) there is: (Ilq) xi E Xi andp p xi < 0, and xi,ci x' for any x' E Xi such that p *x'-S , ,or p *xi<Sp *x'for all x' EXi, i =1,. . .,m.
Debreu's strategy for proving existence of equilibrium in this paper is to prove that a quasi-equilibrium exists and then introduce a further assumption which implies that a quasi-equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium. Arrow and Hahn [2] , and James Moore [21] , follow the same strategy using the closely related notion of a "compensated equilibrium." A compensated equilibrium replaces (II) by: (IIc) xi E Xi andp * xi < 0, andp * xi < p * x' for any x' E Xi such that x' > ixi.
If indifference sets may be thick, (Ilq) is a weaker condition than (Ilc). In particular, when all consumers have income (Ilc) implies Pareto optimality, while (IIq) does not. However, under our assumptions, these concepts are equivalent. The assumption that converts a proof that a quasi-equilibrium exists, given Assumption (2), into a proof of existence for competitive equilibrium is essentially irreducibility, our Assumption (6). These assumptions insure that all consumers have income at a quasi-equilibrium, so the second alternative of (IIq) does not occur and the condition of (IIq) implies (II). Since we are primarily interested in competitive equilibrium, we will not use this order of proof.
THE SURVIVAL ASSUMPTION
Perhaps the most dramatic innovation since 1959 is the discovery that the survival assumption, that is, the first part of Assumption (5), Xi n Y 7 0, can be dispensed with in the presence of the other assumptions, in particular in the presence of Assumption (6) that the economy is irreducible. In retrospect this seems a plausible result. However, it was hidden by the character of the mappings used in the early proofs. These mappings involve demand functions defined on price vectors that are normal to the production set. Then p y < 0 for all y E Y, and in particular for y E Xi n Y. This means that the budget set is never empty and the demand function is always well defined. The demand function may not be upper semi-continuous when the budget plane supports Xi, but the modified function defined by Debreu [7] even has this property. The modified function defines the demand set, when the budget plane supports Xi, as the intersection of Xi and the budget set. Then condition (IIq) of the quasiequilibrium will be satisfied.
On the other hand, the mapping used by Arrow and Hahn to prove that a compensated equilibrium exists avoids mapping by means of a demand function by giving the Pareto frontier in the space of consumers' utilities a central role. Then the mapping can go forward even if prices are used for which the budget set, defined relative to Xi, is empty. Arrow and Hahn map a Cartesian product of a normalized price set, a set of normalized utility vectors from the Pareto efficient frontier, and a set of feasible allocations of goods into convex subsets.
The Pareto efficient frontier is the set of feasible utility allocations { ui }, i = 1, . .. , m, such that there exists no feasible allocation { u'} with ul > ui for all i. If indifference sets may be thick, this mapping need not be upper semicontinuous, so it cannot be used with Debreu's assumptions. Moreover, a compensated equilibrium is Pareto efficient if someone has income, though not necessarily Pareto optimal, while a quasi-equilibrium may not be even Pareto efficient. The key to this distinction is that at a quasi-equilibrium spending is maximized for the utility levels achieved. Therefore, it may be possible to increase everyone's utility without increasing total spending. But when spending is minimized for the utility levels achieved, and there is someone with income, this is no longer possible since to increase this consumer's utility his spending must go up, and no one can reduce spending without losing utility.
Arrow and Hahn still made the survival assumption, but James Moore [21] who uses the Arrow-Hahn mapping with small modifications dispenses with this assumption and replaces it for the purpose of compensated equilibrium by a weakened version of irreducibility. Moore also uses a slightly different Pareto frontier defined as the set of utility allocations { ui 3 such that ui < ui. for all i, for some feasible { u,'), but there is no feasible { u1") such that u," > ui for all i. This allows him to drop the free disposal assumption implicitly made by Arrow and Hahn when they define equilibrium [2, p. 108].
I think there are advantages to the use of the demand function, or correspondence, in proofs of existence, both for mathematical power and for understanding the proof. I will show how the demand correspondence may be used in a mapping of the Cartesian product of the price simplex and the social consumption set into itself whose fixed points are competitive equilibria even in the absence of the survival assumption. At the equilibrium the budget sets will not be empty, the demand correspondences will be well defined and upper semicontinuous, but these conditions need not be satisfied for non-equilibrium prices. We will avoid the difficulties posed by this possibility by using an extension of the demand correspondence which reduces to the original correspondence whenever the original correspondence is well defined and nonempty. The extended demand correspondence will be well defined and nonempty for all price vectors.
We will first prove the special existence theorem in which an interiority assumption is made. Then the general theorem is proved by a limiting argument in which the interior is removed. This argument will be sketched later. Therefore, we make the six assumptions listed in Section 1 except that Assumption (6) is slightly weakened, and Assumption (5) is replaced by The interiority assumption of (5') is easily removed. We will say more about this when recent remarks on free disposal are discussed later. However, two Assumption (2') is a major weakening of (2) since it does not require >-i to be transitive, or even asymmetric, and no convexity assumption is made on the relation Xi (defined by x iy if and only if -y >-ix). As mentioned above, even though transitivity and asymmetry of >-i were introduced and Pi(x) were assumed convex, the non-convexity of Xi would still require a new proof of existence since the value of the demand correspondence need not be convex or even connected. On this point, see Mas-Colell [16] .
Because Assumption (2') does not include convexity and transitivity of preference in the sense of Assumption (2), the argument that excluded fixed points of F involving xi' Ee Xi -Xi in the proof of Theorem 2 can no longer be made. Therefore, to prove existence with the preference correspondences Pi we introduce a stronger assumption of irreducibility. We assume: We may now define a mapping F' whose fixed points will be competitive equilibria for an economy E = (Y, Xi, Pi, i = 1, . . . , m) that satisfies (1), (2'), (3),  (4), (5'), and (6"). First, define f' on S x J1' Xi by f'(p, Hl j'xi) = 1fJ 'f(p, xi) . Thus f'(p, Jjfl'xi) c Rm". Correspondences h and g may be defined as before in the definition of the mapping F. Let F'(p, Jj l'xi) = ((g o h)( ',xi), f'(p, 17 Jjxi) ). Then F' maps S x j J7X,i into the collection of subsets of S x J'ljXl*. Since the values of g, h, f', and fi' lie in compact sets and each is continuous or upper semicontinuous, F is upper semi-continuous. Since g o h is convex valued and not empty as before, and fJ,fi' is also convex valued and not empty, F' has these properties. Then the Kakutani fixed point theorem provides a fixed point for F' on S x fl7,Xi.
We must show that the fixed point of F' is a competitive equilibrium. However, first we will slightly modify condition II to read (IIr) Xi E Xi andp * xi < 0, andp * z > 0 for any z E P(xi), i= L,...,m.
This condition implies (II) whenever i can be consistently defined as a complete weak ordering over Xi. However, (II') is not as restrictive as (II) since (II') allows both x E Pi(y) andy E Pi(x).
Lower semi-continuity of P, and thus of Pi', plays a role like local nonsatiation in the present context to imply the spending of all income for the pseudo-demand functions at a fixed point. Except for the interiority assumption of (5'), this is the modern form of the classical theorem on existence of competitive equilibrium that was promised. Its major improvements are the removal of the survival assumption based on the work of Moore and the discard of transitivity of the preference relation based on the work of Sonnenschein, Shafer, Mas-Colell, and Gale. The interiority assumption is made only for simplicity. A method for its removal will be described in the next section.
x). Thus we only need consider the case x E $(p, x). Suppose there is z E-i(p, x) and (x, z) E Gi, that is, z E P(x). Then y E i(p, x) implies y E Pi'(x), that is, (x, y) E Gi. This implies x E Pi'(x) by convexity of
However, the greatly weakened assumption on preferences for Theorem 3 required that the irreducibility assumption be significantly stronger than Moore's. Irreducibility was assumed for an economy with expanded consumption sets Xi and the improvement for I2 consumers was positive for all i E I2. This stronger form of irreducibility would actually be needed even for preferences of the type assumed by Debreu [7] where thick indifference sets were allowed and transitivity was retained. Otherwise, the contradiction that establishes I2 = 0 is not available, since x,'>. xix* does not imply p * x, > p * x when indifference sets may be thick, that is, when x >-iy and z = ax + (1 -a)y for 0 < a < 1 only implies z iy.
FREE DISPOSAL
The question of free disposal, or more generally, the question of interiority, for existence of equilibrium was essentially settled in McKenzie [19] . However, the explicit proof offered in the original paper does not cover the case of production 
ROLE OF THE FIRM
It is an unusual characteristic of my contributions to the theory of existence of equilibrium that the social production set has been represented by a convex cone. I would claim that this properly represents the Walrasian system where production processes rather than firms are featured, but also it is a fair representation of a Marshallian economy of competitive industries where firm size is small relative to the market and firms operate in a small neighborhood of the minimum cost points on their U-shaped cost curves. The representation of the competitive economy as a fixed collection of disparate firms maximizing profit over concave production functions probably dates from Hicks' Value and Capital [11] , but it was taken up by Arrow and Debreu [1] . Wald [31, 32] had used a simplified Walrasian model. My own initial contribution [17] was in the context of Graham's model of world trade which was also linear. However, I have continued to regard the linear process model to be the appropriate ideal type for the competitive economy.
It should be remarked that in a strict mathematical sense the models of Walras and Hicks are equivalent, without resort to approximations. In one direction this is obvious since linear processes may be assigned to Hicksian firms leading to a social production set that is a cone. This is a Hicksian model without scarce unmarketed resources. In the other direction an artificial construction is needed. An entrepreneurial factor is introduced for each firm which is divided among the owners in proportion to their ownership shares. This factor is always supplied and freely disposable. The production set Yj of the jth firm is displaced by appending minus one unit of the jth entrepreneurial factor to each of its input-output vectors and setting all other entrepreneurial inputs equal to zero. The new production set Yi, for a unit input of entrepreneurship, lies in a space R"n/ when there are 1 firms. Then the social production set Y is taken to be the closure of the set, E7ia' Yj, aj > 0. The only part of the set Y that contributes to an equilibrium is its intersection with the hyperplane defined by setting entrepreneurial components equal to -1. This set is not affected by taking the closure. The pricing of the entrepreneurial factors will provide for the distribution of profits by the firms and the order of proof is the same as before.
On Let ej be a point in RJm, where e, = 1 if the ith entrepreneur is in the jth coalition and e, = 0 otherwise. Let e1 be thejth column of the matrix [e.] which has m rows and 2' columns. Let 7r be a point in Rm representing a distribution of profits, and let v(ej) be the maximum profits attainable by thejth coalition at the ruling prices. Let e E Rm be the vector all of whose components equal 1. Then 7r is in the core if 77* ej > v(ej), for allj, and there exists 6 E R 2 such that 6. =0 or 1, all j, Ej8jej = e, and 7 * ej = v(e1) if 6j = 1. Under these conditions there is a collection of coalitions accommodating all entrepreneurs with sufficient profits to pay their members at the rate 7r and there is no coalition with enough profits to better these rates of pay.
Unfortunately the conditions that will imply a nonempty core are onerous. Scarf [23] has shown that a game has a nonempty core if it is balanced. A game with transferable utility is balanced if, for any 6 E R2. and 7r E Rm, Zj = all i, and 77* ej < v(ej), allj with 6i > 0, implies that S * e < v(e). There seems no reason why these conditions should be met. In particular, they imply that the problems of coordination within firms are overcome by economies of scale in production, no matter how large the firms grow. There can always be a single firm embracing all entrepreneurs to realize the core allocation. The role of the market is unimportant.
There seems no way out of this difficulty except to allow the distribution of effort implied by 6 to be realized in fact, either by a distribution of time over coalitions by individuals or by the presence of many individuals of each of m types who may be spread over coalitions. Then the managerial structure of the firm appears like a linear activity. The whole set of firms generates Y, a convex cone from the origin in Rm+ 1, spanned by (v(ej), -ej), j = 1, . . . , 2m, However, if this way out is chosen there is no advantage over simply treating entrepreneurial resources like other resources, in particular, without the restriction that the amounts of different entrepreneurial resources in a given activity be used in the same amounts, as the coalition model requires, or the restriction that entrepreneurial resources do not affect preferences. I conclude that whatever resources are brought together to comprise the "unmarketed" resource base of the firm are most reasonably treated symmetrically with other resources. Most goods in the real world are indivisible, so the competitive model is an approximation to reality, but the entrepreneurial resources, or firms' special resources, seem to be no more nor less subject to these reservations than other goods or resources. The competitive equilibria are a subset of the fixed points of 5, since technological feasibility is a necessary condition for equilibrium. However, which fixed points of '@? are equilibria will depend on, among other things, what alternative outputs are allowed to the firms, that is, on the precise content of 'j for the jth firm. Given the price vector and the output vector y, a necessary condition for equilibrium is that p * yj be a maximum over 5j (y). But 5j (y) has no empirical correlates except for the constraints imposed by the set of feasible points of 5, that is, 5j (y) contains yj if y is a feasible point. Moreover, the set of fixed points of 5 may not coincide with the set of technically feasible outputs of the economy, unless the GJ can be designed so that they have their assumed properties without introducing new fixed points.
In these circumstances the maps 5j (y) are artificial constructions except for the feasible set, that is, the set of fixed points of well defined '?Ji's. What kinds of feasible sets would admit an appropriate set of L5iG's is unknown. Given that otherwise appropriate L5i's exist, the equilibria may then depend on the choice of the correspondences. Since the papers in the literature do not address these problems it is not clear to what extent the subject has been advanced since 1955. 
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